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Abstract— Both honeypots and network telescopes are extre-
mely powerful tools to analyze malicious network activities.
In this paper we evaluate these two concepts by looking at
data obtained from two such sources over a common time
period. Our viewpoint is biased towards a network management
perspective and we will present in this paper patterns and trends
in misconfigured network devices. We will show that simple to
avoid and well known errors are still present in real deployed
networks and that patterns of faulty configuration can be put
into evidence.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Over the past years, honeypots and network telescopes
emerged as highly efficient toolkits to capture and analyse
malicious network usage. The differences between these two
concepts are due to the reactiveness and scale. While a honepot
serves as a decoy and should mislead a hacker into unveiling
patterns of malicious usage, a network telescope is usuallya
large unused network having as only purpose to capture traffic
destinated towards it. Both concepts have shown their practical
values to both the research and operational communities,
although as of today no comparative study has been yet done.
In this paper we analyse data obtained from a large network
telescope [1] and a distributed honeypot platform [2] and we
look at this data from a network management perspective.
Although data related to traces from denial of services attacks
is highly informative from a security point of view, we were
challenged in our work to see if we can discover patterns of
network misconfigurations. Our paper is structured as follows :
we will start in section 2 with an introduction to honeypots
and backscatter traffic. Section 3 presents our analysis and
research on observed misconfigurations. Finally, section 4
presents related works and section 5 concludes the paper.
II. BACKSCATTER PACKETS ANDHONEYPOT
A. Network telescope
One way to detect network intrusions is to monitor net-
work traffic and detect malicious flows. An alternative is to
monitor only the traffic which has no reason to exist. A
network telescope is a range of unused IP addresses which
are monitored in order to observe malicious traffic because
normally no regular communications should exist to these
addresses. A telescope is characterized by the length of the
prefix of the subnetwork which is observed and this is the
major characteristic which determines the amount of data
gathered by the monitoring process [1]. Traditional telescopes
are passive and store information only about incoming traffic
, but some more advanced telescopes do exist, capable to
perform more active monitoring [3].
B. Backscatter packets
Denial-of-service attacks are traditional attacks aimingat
crashing a specific service or to degrade its performance. This
can be achieved by flooding the victim with TCP packets with
the SYN flag set in order to force the targeted host to deal with
the packets and send the corresponding responses. Because
the attacker aims at securing his privacy, spoofed IP can be
used and forged packets are sent to the victim. The packet is
received and the response is generated and sent to this spoofed
destination. The attacker is not overloaded by the response
packets of its own attack and additional traffic will hit a third
party (the spoofed source). These response packets are called
backscatters packets [4] [5]. For an excellent introduction
these topics please see [6]. The figure 1 shows a simplified
scenario, where a hacker uses 3 spoofed IP addresses : one
is assigned to a real machine and the others are not assigned
to real operational machines, but instead are monitored by a
network telescope.
Fig. 1. Backscatter principle
C. Honeypots and HoneyNets
In [2] a honeypot is defined as ”an environment where
vulnerabilities have been deliberately introduced in order to
observe attacks and intrusions”. Therefore, honeypots arecom-
puters connected to the Internet with no apparent protection
to intrusions. Moreover, most of time, the honeypots are not
used for normal activity and all traffic is abnormal. Contrary
to the network telescope which monitors a large range of
IP addresses and gathers a lot of data, the honeypots can
be deployed in different locations and monitor only few
addresses. The goal of a distributed honeynet is to obtain
statistical information about intrusions by grouping together
informations of the different honeypots in a single database.
III. D ETECTING MISCONFIGURATIONS
A. Sources
Telescope Honeypot
#monitored addresses 16 777 216 129
Number of inco-
ming packets
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
334 866 721
106 514 961
0
457 980 950
170 139 630
0
566 326 329
69 716 055
475 519
1 211 820
1 495 525
1 821 534
1 371 280
2 317 525
2 292 083
1 451 770
Number of
unique IP
addresses
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
184 282
121 828
0
229 719
168 631
0
281 084
162 607
18 392
39 419
34 011
49 076
60 666
77 032
84 485
82 500
Size of data
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
23,7 GB
7,6 GB
0 GB
24,1 GB
12,3 GB
0 GB
40,4 GB
12 GB
69 MB
176 MB
217 MB
264 MB
199 MB
337 MB
333 MB
211 MB
Number of days
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
6
3
0
7
3
0
7
2
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
TABLE I
GLOBAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE DATA . THE MONTHS ARE
REPRESENTED IN NUMBER(05, 06, 07...)
To compare the honeynet and telescope data, we have
chosen to analyse data from a common timeframe to both such
platforms : May 2004 to December 2004. For the telescope we
have used the data from a very large telescope (the CAIDA’s
project for which only backscatter data are available [7]).This
is a /8 telescope and so monitors224 IP addresses [1]. The
data are divided into several files : one by day and represents
a total of about 1.7 billions captured packets. However, the
packets were not captured during the entire period but only for
some days. The data from the honeynet is not so abundant, but
covers all days of the period. Because the daily quantity is not
relevant with respect to the telescope, all the observations have
been grouped on a monthly basis. We have used the data from
the Leurre.com project which is composed of 43 honeypots,
where each emulates under VMWare 3 different vulnerable
perating systems. For more details about the (H2) platform
please see [8]. For the period from May to December 2004,
12437056 incoming packets have been captured. The table I
shows a summary about the data.
B. Abnormal source addresses
During a preliminary analysis of the data, we were amazed
by the large quantity of observed IP addresses that should in
theory never appear on the Internet. Several factors jointly
produce them : misconfigured enterprise routers/firewalls,
missing ISP level ingress/egress filtering and maybe defective
devices. The table II gives a summary of such addresses as
well as their target deployment usage.
Range Description
10.0.0.0→ 10.255.255.255 Class A private addresses
172.16.0.0→ 172.31.255.255 Class B private addresses
192.168.0.0→ 192.168.255.255 Class C private addresses
224.0.0.0→ 239.255.255.255 Class D multicast addresses
240.0.0.0→ 255.255.255.255 Class E addresses reserved for
experimental use
127.0.0.0→ 127.255.255.255 Loopback addresses
0.0.0.0→ 0.255.255.255 addresses of network 0 (class
A)
169.254.0.0→ 169.254.255.255 addresses of DHCP client
which can’t obtain an address
from the server
192.0.2.0→ 192.0.2.255 Loopback addresses
TABLE II
ABNORMAL SOURCE ADDRESSES ONINTERNET
1) Backscatter analysis:The left barchart of figure 2 shows
the proportion (per 100 000) of the different types of abnormal
addresses in comparison with the total number of unique
IP addresses for the observed days. This graph allows to
observe both the main types of abnormal addresses and their
corresponding global proportion.
There is a category which is about constant (colored in
black). It is the proportion of network 0 addresses (class
A). Normally 0.0.0.0 can be used only as source broadcast
address on local segments but not on the global Internet.
However the global proportion increases significantly from
June to August with peaks in June, at the end of August and
the beginning of September. Very strangely is also the ap-
parition of multicast addresses as source addresses. Multicast
addresses can be only used as a destination address and will
never appear as source addresses. Moreover this increase in
abnormal addresses is also due to private IP addresses used
i outgoing reply packets. These packets are received by the
t lescope (and for these packets the source appears to be a
private IP address). The most probably source of these packets
are misconfigured routers/firewalls/NATs. These packets are
generated by victims, such that we can safely assume that the
majority is not malicious. A second explanation is that these
victims or a subset of them detected the attack and replied
with forged packets, possible for instance with tools like
IPPersonality [9]. This increase can be also caused by an ISP
deploying some new policy based routing rules, which were
misconfigured. The concerned computers are connected to
Internet but don’t receive the responses of their own requests.
Another justification of the apparition of private addresses (the
class C for instance, which are generally used by home users)
are a definite evidence of misconfigured network devices.
However, the main issue is that the ISP does not block these
addresses.
We observed that 169.254.0.0 traffic is not visible in the
telescope, although it appears in the honeynets. This traffic is
due to hosts which have do not receive DHCP replies. Since
the traffic in the telescope only have backscatter data, this
traffic remains invisible to a telecope, because the concerned
hosts do not become the target of attacks. However, these hosts
might be infected by worms and as such can directly initiate
outgoing traffic to the Internet.
2) Honeypot data:We performed a similar analysis with
the data from the honeynet (at the right on the same figure 2)
but in this case a bar represents a month period. The results
show a different pattern than the backscatter analysis. Firt
the graph shows two peaks but not at the same time. The
first in May and the second in July. The usage of private
class IP addresses is also significant and the explanation might
be the same i.e. the misconfiguration of local network and
providers that don’t do ingress filtering. However the main
type of abnormal IPs is the range of addresses automatically
assigned by a computer when the DHCP server don’t respond
to its request for obtaining an address. The cause is probably
due to local networks with a non valid configuration of the
DHCP service.
For comparing the two traces, we had to compare data from
backscatter traffic observed from the telescope with data
(directly incoming and backscatter) from the honeynets. We
could not rely entirely on only the backscatter traffic from the
honeynets due to the lack of massive datasets.
C. MS Windows specific ports
The MS Windows operating systems uses a series of
defaults ports for its own network protocols : ports 137, 138,
139 and 445. The Netbios service is designed for sharing
resources on a local network and this port should not be
available from the Internet. To prevent these attacks, these
ports should be filtered by a firewall.
1) Backscatter analysis:The figure 3 shows the number of
unique IP addresses with an open port per 100 000 unique
addresses that suffered denial of service attacks. The ports
137, 138 and 445 seem to be protected even if there is a little
peak for the port 445 in November. However it’s clear that the
port 139 is less filtered as we can see on the several peaks of
the graphs. It seems that in 2004, professional networks and
home computers were generally protected by firewalls contrary
to some years before.
2) Honeypot analysis:The honeypot data contains only
one IP address having the port 139 open, such that the
use of honeypot is not a good way to detect this kind of
misconfiguration. Only a telescope with a large IP range can
efficiently detect it. However you can notice that the only
visible port is also the one which is the most frequently
observed as opened by the telescope.
Fig. 3. Number of unique IPs with an open port per 100 000 unique IP
a dresses and according to each specific windows port. The chart represents
the backscatter data.
D. Analysis of ICMP ’Destination unreachable’ message
When a host connects to another host which is not available,
an ICMP message is sent to the source with the type 3 equal to
’Destination unreachable message’. An additional code [10] is
also used to provide additional information. We analyzed the
following 8 codes in our work :
– 0 : net unreachable
– 1 : host unreachable
– 2 : protocol unreachable
– 3 : port unreachable
– 4 : fragmentation needed and don’t fragment was set
– 9 : communication with destination network is adminis-
tratively prohibited
– 10 : communication with destination host is administra-
tively prohibited
– 13 : communication administratively prohibited
Some firewalls will typically answer with codes 9 or 10 to
show that a device or service is filtered. Although such infor-
mation can be very helpful when troubleshooting a network,
it can leak information about existing devices/open ports to
an attacker and could determine him to try more advanced
reconnaissance techniques. Firewalls that well engineered ,
configured by more security conscious network managers
might directly reply with a RST. We can observe a configu-
ration pattern evolving over the year 2004. In the beginning
of the year, firewall configuration was globally verbose and
attacker friendly. Administrative prohibited (code 13) type of
messages and host unreachable (code 1) are used abundantly.
This type of configuration leaks important information to an
Fig. 2. Number of unique IP addresses of the different categori s of abnormal addresses per 100 000 unique IP addresses. (Left : backscatter data, right :
honeypot data by month)
attacker. Receiving an ICMP message with an administrative
prohibited code implies that the service port is open and that
maybe a simple access control based on the source of the IP
packet disallows any communication. In this case, spoofing
this information and blindly attacking the service can leadto
a success (for the attacker). Similarly, receiving an ICMP with
a code 1, is helpfull when scanning a network. This is called
also inverse scanning, because learning which hosts are noton
the network allows to infer the IP addresses that are allocated
on the same network. We see that a global trend towards a less
verbose configuration is visible and more and more firewalls
reply with a port unreachable message. The same behavior can
be observed on the honeynets.
The drastic change observed in 4 can be du to a novel
configuration of a firewall. The essential fact however is the
comparison between the telescope and honeynet, for which
we can state only hypotheses. In the telescope data we have
a drastic change due to 2 main reasons :
– high decrease of the code 13 : firewalls configuration
changes to hide the firewalls
– switching between code 1 and code 3 : the attacks are
targeted towards real host contrary to before
For the honeynet data, we observe the same changes but
these are not so drastic (except for the code 1). Moreover the
changes do not occur at the same time period.
The important fact is that the two methods give somehow
identical results but for the telescope the change is much
more important, then the smooth change observed on the
honeynet. In fact, all IP addresses monitored by the telescope
are from the same subnetwork. If an attacker spoofs using
this range of addresses (for instance by bad random generator,
use of a specific subnetwork...) and targets the same hosts,
the telescope observes a drastic change when the firewalls of
these hosts change their policy.
For the honeynet, the picture looks totally different. For this
data we have contiguous data and the IP addresses are well
distributed in the address space.
E. Attacked services
A natural question is related to which services are the most
attacked services and whether these services should have been
accessible to the Internet. We did this analysis on a day by
day basis and some of our main findings follow :
– The most attacked port and consistently ranked number 1
over all this period is port 80 : it seems that web servers
are the major target of denial of service attacks. This
service should be accessible to the Internet such that we
can not point out a misconfiguration.
– port 6667 shows up frequently in the attacks. This port is
typically used for IRC talks (or IRC anonymizing proxies
like psyBNC). We suppose that these attacks are targeted
at specific servers and can be associated to Internet war
games waged to take the control of a a IRC channel.
Similarly to the previous case, this service/port should
always be accessible, unless a compromised machine is
used to serve as proxy to cover a malicious bot master.
– Name Servers (port 53) are also attacked (although to a
lesser extend than IRC). For our study, we did not want
to be invasive and to check the function of the attacked
servers, but in general a well secured DNS server should
never allow a zone transfer (if important information can
be leaked out) such that these cases are very important
examples of misconfigurations.
– Attacks against BGP routers (identified by received
SYN/ACKs from a port 179) are also highly interesting
and can be observed, since these attacks aim at either de-
Fig. 4. Proportion of the different ICMP codes for the icmp tye 3 (Destination unreachable). Backscatter data are repres nted at the left and honeypot data
is at right
Port Vulnerability
1011 Augudor
1025 Spybot
1433 Spybot
6000 Lovgate
7000 SubSeven
7001 Freak88
7300 NetMonitor
8000 Gaobot
TABLE III
SOME SERVICES WHICH ARE IN THE MOST ATTACKED SERVICES AND
WHICH PRESENT KNOWN VULNERABILITIES
connecting a network domain, or can serve as prelimina-
ries for a routing prefix hijack. Similarly to the previous
case, BGP connections should be filtered and available
only to well known peers having contractual bindings
The table IV compare the most attacked services between
the telescope (3 days) and the honeypot for May. The overlap
of the ports is small : only the port 80. However, if we consider
table V for September, the views match because 7 common
ports appear in both the honeynet and in the telescope data.
To conclude, even if sometimes, the two methods allow to get
the same results, it appears that the results can be different and
therefore the methods can be considered as complementary.
Moreover, in these tables (IV and V) an interesting fact is
to have the port 7000 which is known as a backdoor. In the
table III the ports which are in the most attacked services with
known vulnerabilities are listed. These ports are commonly
used by backdoors or ports used for the spreading of a worm.
While it’s unclear for us, why someone would do a denial
of service attack against them, having these ports open and
accessible to the Internet are clear signs of misconfigured
routers/firewalls. Even if internal machines were compromised
by an internal/external user, an additional filtering properly
secured firewall to deny access to them, would have limited
the exposure and the impact of the intrusion.
IV. RELATED WORKS
In [4], the authors used a telescope to monitor denial-of-
service attacks activity. Some limitations are clearly defined
like that reflector attacks are possible, maybe the addresses
are not randomly generated in all the address space and the
ISP can do ingress filtering. In [5] another approach is chosen
to analyse backscatter data by using spectral analysis and this
method showed that the spoofed addresses are not generated
with a good randomness property. The author in [3] proposes
another type of telescope which can respond to the request of
the attackers and get more information about them. This kind
of architecture is more complex and demands to monitor less
address space but in order to limit the required bandwidth,
some additional sampling methods are needed. Finally, some
statistics like the mean length of attacks of the mean number
of targeted subnetworks can be computed and the authors have
observed that only 5% of the traffic is backscatter traffic.
Honeypot analysis is presented in [2] and [11] and some
of the described results cover the discovery of new threats,
the localization of the attacks, the operating systems of the
attackers as well as their behavior and network scanning
activities.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a preliminary study of very large
network data from both a network telescope and a distributed
honeynet. We were challenged in our work by two questions.
The first one concerned the differences and similarities in
views from such different platforms and the identification of
peculiar properties of each of these. Our second motivation
was to analyse configuration errors and patterns of misconfi-
guration. We showed that backscatter data available from the
network telescope is very useful for these purposes. The main
difficulty encountered during our work is related to processing
such large datasets : data counts to more than 120 GB and this
task pushed our computational resources to their limits. Future
Honeypot Telescope
May
80 35 (63.64)
6667 5 (9.09)
3389 3 (5.45)
7000 3 (5.45)
1107 1 (1.82)
1205 1 (1.82)
1214 1 (1.82)
1235 1 (1.82)
1254 1 (1.82)
1271 1 (1.82)
2004-05-26 2004-05-27 2004-05-28
80 734 (7.61)
21 15 (0.16)
6667 15 (0.16)
139 13 (0.13)
1002 12 (0.12)
22 10 (0.10)
8080 10 (0.10)
110 9 (0.09)
113 8 (0.08)
111 6 (0.06)
80 973 (10.03)
21 17 (0.18)
4662 15 (0.15)
139 13 (0.13)
25 11 (0.11)
8080 11 (0.11)
110 10 (0.10)
113 10 (0.10)
135 10 (0.10)
22 8 (0.08)
80 980 (16.27)
139 14 (0.23)
21 13 (0.22)
22 11 (0.18)
113 10 (0.17)
25 10 (0.17)
8080 9 (0.15)
443 8 (0.13)
110 6 (0.10)
178 6 (0.10)
TABLE IV
THE MOST ATTACKED SERVICES DURINGMAY WHICH HAVE SENT SYN/ACK. THE FIRST NUMBER IS THE PORT AND THE SECOND THE NUMBER OF
UNIQUE IP ADDRESSES WHICH ARE CONCERNED. THE NUMBER BETWEEN PARENTHESIS IS THE PERCENTAGE ACCORDING TO ALL UNIQUE COUPLE IP
ADDRESS- OPEN PORT
Honeypot Telescope
September
80 116 (50.88)
7000 49 (21.49)
7100 11 (4.82)
22 9 (3.95)
7200 7 (3.07)
7090 6 (2.63)
3389 4 (1.75)
21 3 (1.32)
113 2 (0.88)
6667 2 (0.88)
2004-09-01 2004-09-02 2004-09-03
80 956 (14.89)
7000 37 (0.58)
7200 13 (0.20)
7100 12 (0.19)
21 10 (0.16)
25 9 (0.14)
22 8 (0.12)
443 8 (0.12)
8080 8 (0.12)
3389 7 (0.11)
80 1100 (19.66)
139 413 (7.38)
7000 30 (0.54)
7100 22 (0.39)
7200 18 (0.32)
21 14 (0.25)
3389 11 (0.20)
22 10 (0.18)
8080 8 (0.14)
25 7 (0.13)
80 508 (17.69)
7000 24 (0.84)
7100 21 (0.73)
7200 18 (0.63)
3389 12 (0.42)
21 11 (0.38)
8080 8 (0.28)
139 5 (0.17)
6000 5 (0.17)
1524 2 (0.07)
TABLE V
THE MOST ATTACKED SERVICES DURINGSEPTEMBER WHICH HAVE SENTSYN/ACK. THE FIRST NUMBER IS THE PORT AND THE SECOND THE NUMBER
OF UNIQUE IP ADDRESSES WHICH ARE CONCERNED. THE NUMBER BETWEEN PARENTHESIS IS THE PERCENTAGE ACCORDING TO ALL UNIQUE COUPLE
IP ADDRESS- OPEN PORT
work will address more advanced data mining and statistical
analysis techniques.
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